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## Senate

The Senate met in executive session at 10 o'clock a.m., and was called to order by the Vice President.

The Chaplain, Rev. Frederick Brown Harris, D.D., offered the following prayer:

Father of all, whose righteous laws condemn and will at last break whatsoever bars Thy children from abundant life: In these days freighted with destiny, for whose decisions the future will judge us, by Thine enabling might may Thy servants here in the ministry of public affairs maintain their integrity unsullied by personal animosities, prejudices, or selfish ambitions.

And now as there looms the hour when for men and nations comes the moment to decide, to whatever decision come those who here speak for this free land, this day in a choice between frowning risks on either side, may those who give their consent and those who withhold it alike be sustained by the supreme satisfaction that, in a grave crisis, they have done their full duty, and that in the face of trembling and fearful humanity their vote represents their patriotic judgment deserving well of the Republic.

We ask it in the Redeemer's name. Amen.

### TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE LEGISLATIVE BUSINESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, as in legislative session, there be a morning hour for 5 minutes, at the end of which time I should like to suggest the absence of a quorum.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

### THE JOURNAL

On the request of Mr. MANSFIELD, and by unanimous consent, the reading of the Journal of the proceedings of Friday, September 20, 1963, and Monday, September 23, 1963, was dispensed with.

### DEATH OF TILLMAN B. HUSKEY, CHIEF CABINETMAKER IN THE SENATE

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, on August 24, just 1 day before his birthday,

Tillman B. Huskey, Sr., who was the chief cabinetmaker on the Senate side, passed away.

Mr. Huskey served this body for nearly 30 years. I wish to take note of his passing, because he was among those whom the public never sees, but who so faithfully serve the Senate.

### QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE TEST BAN TREATY

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, last week, after the completion of my remarks on the test ban treaty, the distinguished Senator from South Carolina [Mr. THURMOND] placed in the Record 36 questions he would have asked me with respect to this treaty if he had been on the floor when I concluded.

Inasmuch as it was necessary for me to leave, to go back to Missouri for the remainder of the week, in order to fulfill several longstanding engagements, I was not in a position to answer.

Upon my return to town yesterday, however, I worked on answers to these questions; and I ask unanimous consent that they be printed, together with the questions, at this point in the Record.

I take this opportunity to commend the Senator from South Carolina for the many long hours he has spent in studying this matter. We agree on many points; on others, we do not. I wish we could agree on all, especially inasmuch as I know of the complete sincerity of his position.

Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from South Carolina also put in the Record the transcript of a television program of April 28 in which I participated. That program was conducted at a time when the Preparedness Subcommittee was giving consideration to the so-called comprehensive treaty—one far different from the treaty that is under consideration today, in that it involved an onsite inspection agreement to supervise underground testing.

There being no objection, the questions and the answers were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

1. Question. The Senator is in a unique position, since he is a member of both the Foreign Relations Committee and the Preparedness Subcommittee, and signed the reports of both committees. I believe the Senator from Missouri has attested that the

factual data in the Preparedness Subcommittee's report is accurate. Is that correct?

Answer. As I stated in my additional views that are included in the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee report, "To the best of my knowledge the factual data contained in the report of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee is correct. But I believe the findings and conclusions are overly pessimistic as to the effect of the treaty on our national security."

2. Question. Does the Senator subscribe to the opinion of the Foreign Relations Committee, stated in its report, that, and I quote: "But exclusive, or excessive, reliance on military considerations could undermine national security by encouraging comparable military efforts by others, thereby strengthening the destabilizing forces adrift in the world, possibly creating new ones."

Answer. Everyone agrees that military considerations are very important. However, no one believes that military factors are the sole considerations. For example, I have expressed concern particularly because of the likely proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities in the world. While I do not believe that this treaty by itself will stop such proliferation, I do believe that the treaty could be a small step in that direction.

3. Question. I notice that the Senator states that "unless there can be some understanding among the growing number of nations that will have the weapon, a nuclear holocaust is only a question of time." Does the Senator mean to imply that armaments, rather than human weaknesses, cause wars?

Answer. Both armaments and human weakness are required for war. It is unfortunately true also that armaments and human strength are both required to maintain a just peace. It is the kind and proliferation of armaments, not the existence of armaments, that are now in issue.

4. Question. The United States has maintained a level of armaments over recent years unequalled in all history. Would the Senator not agree that these armaments have been the very factor that has prevented nuclear war?

Answer. They have been a mighty important factor. I believe that these armaments have been important in causing the Soviet withdrawal of missiles from Cuba and in preventing many other Communist adventures, especially in Europe and perhaps the Far East. The existence of U.S. military power, known to the Soviets, has in my opinion prevented Soviet conduct which might well have led to war.

5. Question. Would the Senator not agree that the only way in which one can be sure of preventing nuclear war, so long as the Communists maintain their goal of world domination, is to keep an overwhelming superiority in strategic military power?

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Answer. It is vital that the United States maintain its capability to destroy the Soviet Union if a retaliatory strike is required.

6. Question. The Senator from Missouri has correctly pointed out that the military disadvantages of the treaty to the Soviet Union must also be considered, along with the military disadvantages to the United States. Would not the Senator from Missouri agree that in assessing the relative military disadvantages of the treaty, that the starting point, in terms of technology, of both the United States and the Soviet Union, is largely determinative of the degree of disadvantage from prohibition of testing in a particular environment?

Answer. As I understand the question, I agree that the degree of disadvantage imposed on a nation by the treaty is determined, to some extent, by where that nation is now as compared with the other in terms of nuclear technology. There is a tendency for progress to come harder to the nation ahead—breaking new ground. For example, advancements in yield-to-weight ratios become more difficult as one approaches the theoretical limits. Thus the Soviets—behind in medium- and low-yield weapons—could, if unlimited testing were allowed, be expected to make relatively rapid progress in those areas. Under the treaty, however, Soviet progress in these areas can be expected to be slower.

7. Question. The Senator has pointed out that the Soviets will be unable to test for blackout phenomena after the treaty goes into effect, just as will the United States. Isn't it a fact, however, that the Soviets specifically tested for blackout phenomena, and particularly as it applies to ABM systems, in the 1961-62 series, but that the United States has made no comparable test?

Answer. The Joint Chiefs of Staff said that the Soviets may possess some information not available to the United States. Dr. Brown, in his testimony added: "Yes, and we have some data that they may not have." Dr. Brown has stated that our tests were comparable to theirs—particularly in that they provided a much broader range of data from which extrapolation can be made with more confidence; that each side has had about the same number of tests, over yield ranges and altitude ranges which are comparable though not identical; that enough has been learned in the United States to verify the existence, nature, and rough dependence of blackout characteristics on yield and altitude, although important details still have not been explored; that the same is probably true in the Soviet Union; that enough is now known in the United States to determine for example how blackout enters, with other factors, in the anti-ICBM problem, in determining the optimum radar frequency; and that both sides have done several tests with very extensive instrumentation. Both Dr. Brown and Dr. Bradbury testified that blackout tests were conducted by the United States in 1958 and 1962 and that we have learned enough about the problem to be able to take measures to design around it. Senator SPARKMAN on September 16 dealt with the matter. He referred also to the testimony in executive hearings of Mr. John McCone. I refer the Senate to the same source.

8. Question. Another factor which bears heavily on the relative military disadvantages of the treaty, as I am sure the Senator will agree, is the different strategies of the United States and the Soviets. Since the United States must rely on second strike capabilities, it must test to determine every possible vulnerability in its weapons systems, for to leave one that is unknown could spell disaster in the event of any enemy first strike. Since the Soviets rely on the strategy of a first, or preemptive strike, they do not have to test for the purpose of insuring the invulnerability of their own weapons sys-

tems, but can concentrate on ferreting out one or two vulnerabilities of our weapons systems and the proper weapons design to exploit our weapons systems vulnerabilities that they have found. Does this factor not require, in effect, far more comprehensive nuclear testing for weapons effects and proof tests by the United States to maintain its second strike force than is necessary for the Soviets to advance their first strike force?

Answer. Without regard to what the Soviet strategy actually is, prudence requires the United States to maintain strategic forces capable of surviving any Soviet surprise attack and delivering a devastating counter-blow. In this connection, it is important to understand, with as little uncertainty as possible, the phenomena which may bear on the survivability of our systems. As I said on September 17, "While I regret . . . that the United States did not, before now, find the answer to more of the gnawing vulnerability questions, I am convinced that the Soviets, limited as they are by the terms of this treaty, will not be able to change the elemental facts of the strategic nuclear power balance." Our systems are many in number and involve great redundancy in command and control. This being the case, it is most unlikely that any one or two vulnerabilities will be critical. And, it should be noted that, hampered by the test ban, the Soviets will have difficulty estimating the nature of any weaknesses in U.S. systems which may exist.

9. Question. The Senator states that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have seen no need for a 100-megaton bomb. Is the Senator not aware that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have, in fact, recommended that we go ahead with the development of the big bomb?

Answer. The Secretary of Defense, in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, assured that "the United States, without any future testing, can develop a warhead with a yield of 50 to 60 megatons for B-52 delivery." This size and type weapon, I understand, falls within the range of interest expressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the recommendation referred to. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in their statement of position on the limited test ban treaty said that "The Joint Chiefs of Staff have not regarded as important the attainment of weapons in the 100-megaton range from which the United States will be debarred by the treaty. They feel that the types and numbers of megaton yield weapons available to us now or in the future could give us an adequate capability in the high-yield weapon range." As the report of the Foreign Relations Committee points out: "Even Dr. Edward Teller, a critic of the treaty, recently commented: 'It is not clear to me that these very big yields will result in a substantial advantage for the Russians. . . . In evaluating the consequences of the test ban, I do not place very great importance on the lead which the Russians enjoy in this particular field.'" He has also agreed that we do not need atmospheric testing in order to construct larger bombs.

10. Question. Isn't it also a fact that General LeMay recommended the development of a big bomb as early as 1954, but that he was refused?

Answer. General LeMay testified: "I asked for, the Air Force asked for, a big yield bomb as early as 1954." Testimony also brought out this was a bomb of over 50 megatons.

11. Question. Isn't it a fact that one of the reasons that the recommendation of the military for development of a big bomb has never been approved lies in the fact that the defense policy of the Nation is based on a shift in reliance from manned aircraft, which could deliver a very high yield weapon, to ballistic missiles, in which we do not now have a capability of delivering the necessary weight to achieve the very high yield?

Answer. I am told that the reasons for no decision to develop a very big bomb are

many. The principal one is the absence of a military role in which such a weapon was superior to smaller weapons. It must be borne in mind that, as weapons to use against military targets in a retaliation role, larger numbers of smaller weapons are to be preferred on a cost-effectiveness basis, and also because the smaller delivery systems are easier to harden or make mobile. With respect to the shift in emphasis to missile delivery, it should be remembered both that manned aircraft will have an important role in the foreseeable future and that, without atmospheric testing, larger warheads could be developed and stockpiled for our bombers as well as our future missile systems.

12. Question. The Preparedness Subcommittee report, in which the Senator from Missouri attests as to the accuracy of the facts reports as a fact that, and I quote: "The United States will be unable to acquire necessary data on the effects of very high yield atmospheric explosions. Without such knowledge it is unlikely that a realistic assessment can be made of the military value of such weapons." Would the Senator not agree that the Soviets have a distinct lead over the United States in this area, and that we do not now have the necessary information from which to assess the military potential of the 100-megaton bomb when used against us.

Answer. This part of the subcommittee report was a conclusion, and by the testimony a disputed fact. Dr. Harold Brown, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, stated that "although they have done more high yield tests, those were not effects tests. Their geography, and the associated activity does not indicate to me that they are effects tests." Here again, I refer the Senate to the testimony in executive hearings by Mr. John McCone, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. With respect to the adequacy of information at our disposal, I repeat my regrets, stated to the Senate on September 17, that we did not, before now, take more steps to reduce our uncertainties relating to the survivability of our missile force. But I am advised that we do have a great deal of information from which to assess the military potential of a 100-megaton bomb used against us; and that the Soviets know no more than we do about any vulnerabilities that may exist.

13. Question. Would the Senator not agree, that regardless of whether the United States would decide, after acquisition of sufficient information on which to make a realistic evaluation, to build a 100-megaton bomb for its own arsenal or not, that it is a major disadvantage for the enemy to have a major weapon of which he knows the military potential, and for the United States to know existence of the weapon, but to be precluded from ascertaining with some degree of certainty its military potential?

Answer. There is no reason to believe that the Soviets know more than we do about the military potential of a 100-megaton bomb. Neither side has tested one. The 60-megaton test by the Soviets was a weapons, not effects, test. As for the implication of a Soviet technological lead in the very high yield range, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have testified that technological superiority is only one aspect of the net security which must take into account the number of weapons, variety of delivery systems and the magnitude of nuclear plant and stockpile: "As to net superiority in ability to inflict damage on the enemy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the United States at present is clearly ahead of the U.S.S.R. in the ability to wage strategic nuclear war." We have data from which we can estimate the effects of very large weapons.

14. Question. The Senator is quite pessimistic about the ability of either the United States or the Soviet Union to develop an effective ABM system. According to the information we now have, the Soviets have